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On this date: Warship no. 111 laid down, Kure Naval Arsenal

Writer: Tony Boccia
Tony Boccia
7 hours ago
6 min read

Updated: 27 minutes ago

Greetings PHG fans! Today marks an auspicious event in naval history. It was on 7 November 1940 that the keel for Imperial Japanese Navy warship no.111 was laid down at Kure Naval Arsenal. Fourth of her class, construction was paused when the ship was 30% complete at the outbreak of the Pacific War, and the project was outright cancelled in March 1942. The ship was dismantled, and altogether only two of her sisters ever went to sea as designed. Number 110, third in class, went to sea in an entirely different form. Warship no. 111 was, of course the unnamed fourth Yamato-class super battleship. Let's dig into some history!


The Super-battleship Yamato
The Super battleship Yamato

The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 had set in place a series of agreements, one of which, the Five-Power Treaty, placed a moratorium on new capital ship construction for ten years. Following that, any new battleship would have to be kept to a standard displacement, and her guns could be no larger than 16". The treaty also called for scrapping any capital ship not already commissioned. The purpose of the treaties signed at the Conference was to stop the global naval arms race that was harming the already over-burdened economies of the signatories. Ironically, these countries had all been allies in the First World War; Great Britain (and her dominions), the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. The lack of a common enemy and the mad scramble to consolidate power in overseas colonies drove the arms race of the 1920's. Smaller nations, such as Japan, were kept to a smaller fleet. This is the 5:5:3 rule, meaning that for every 5 tons afloat in the US or Royal Navy, Japan could only have 3.


To put it mildly, the war plans of the Imperial Japanese Navy did not fit with the terms of the Washington Naval Conference. When the Mukden Incident occurred in 1934 and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, they also removed themselves from the various naval treaties they had signed the previous decade and moved full-steam ahead on an aggressive series of naval construction projects. Among these was a complete modernization of the four Kongo-class battleships, several classes of destroyer, and the creation of a class of super battleships. The projects were ambitious even by Japanese standards, and had two goals: expanding Japan's reach into the surrounding seas and winning a decisive battle against a peer adversary.


Extending Japan's influence and hard power was an essential aim in the inter-war period. In 1914, Japan had conquered German territories in Micronesia, and added these to her burgeoning overseas empire that included Taiwan (1895) Manchuria (1905) and Korea (1911). Defending the sea lanes crossing their Pacific empire, and projecting power outward toward Western colonies in the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines was of national strategic importance. In addition, Japan recognized they would need raw materials from these territories in the event of war; having a fleet with as long a reach as possible was necessary to carry out this effort. Alongside ships, forward bases would be required that could host repair sites, combat-capable logistics nodes, and reinforcements.


The decisive battle doctrine was a feature of IJN naval planning from way back. Admiral Togo had won a decisive battle over the Russians at Tsushima Strait in 1905, a glorious victory that effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War and showcased superior Japanese gunnery, seamanship, and small-ship tactics with torpedoes (students of the Second World War may recognize these elements). The Japanese, high off their victory at Tsushima, noted that the Russians were fighting at the end of a seven-month, 18,000 nm journey, exhausted and hardly battle-ready. The proximity of Japanese ports such as Nagasaki, and the naval arsenals at Maizuru and Sasebo also helped keep the Japanese well supplied; even if the Russians had made it through to their Pacific ports, how dangerous could they have been, at the end of a long and tenuous supply line?


With this focus on securing sea lanes and supply routes coupled with the idea that a superior force could be destroyed and the war won in short order, Japan's naval doctrine moved forward in leaps and bounds following their departure from the League of Nations and various treaty obligations. We can debate the merits of this in another blog post (Maybe during a visit to WW2TV?) but the fact is, the concept pervaded every part of IJN war planning and combat philiosophy. At the same time, it had also became clear to Japanese planners that any future war with the United States would be defined by economic output in both countries. Winning that decisive battle as quickly as possible, with as few ships as necessary, and in a location of the IJN's choosing became more important than ever.


Enter the Yamato-class super battleship; meant to engage multiple capital ships at once, with superior firepower and fire control, these ships were quite literally like nothing the world had ever seen. Their massive size (862' overall), 16 inches of side armor, and a displacement of 71,000 tons when fully loaded are all hallmarks of the Yamato-class. Three turrets with three18.1 inch guns, each barrel weighing 162 tons, could launch a 3,200 pound projectile almost 46,000 yards; roughly 26 miles. That said, each ship would still require an enormous amount of fuel, and the idea of forward-basing had to move forward alongside this new construction. The Japanese war planners had to ask themselves: could a Yamato-class ship, accompanied by a group of fast battleships and heavy cruisers, alongside light cruisers, destroyers, and oilers fight at the end of a string? For how long?


Five ships were planned, and although this was later pared down to four, the first ship in class, Yamato, was commissioned in Kure Naval Arsenal on 16 December 1941. Five months later, the second in class, Musashi, was commissioned at Nagasaki. Warships no. 110 and 111, third and fourth in class, were designed to have significant improvements over their sisters; stronger secondary gun defenses, a reinforced bottom to defeat mines and torpedoes, and changes to propeller pitch were all planned out. From November 1940 until December 1941, work continued on Yamato and no. 111 at the same time. By the time Yamato was finished, however, the calculus at sea had changed. The US battleship fleet had been largely destroyed at Pearl Harbor, and the Japanese had also sunk two British capital ships off Malaya, all using aircraft. Clearly, battleships were not the future of naval warfare. Work paused on nos. 110 (roughly 70% complete) and 111 (30%), and soon, the two projects were cancelled.


A record of the Imperial Japanese Navy's war preparation plans, courtesy of the National Diet Library https://dl.ndl.go.jp/ja/pid/8815691/1/13
A record of the Imperial Japanese Navy's war preparation plans, courtesy of the National Diet Library https://dl.ndl.go.jp/ja/pid/8815691/1/13

The same record as above, translated.
The same record as above, translated by Google.

Following the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway, in June 1942, the IJN had a serious problem with the Yamato-class. Neither Yamato or Musashi had taken part in the action at Midway. No. 110 was taking up too much valuable space in her slipway, and was too far along to justify dismantling her. No. 111 was less complete, and the materials could be used elsewhere. It was decided to redesign warship no. 110 as an aircraft carrier, which was commissioned in November 1944 as Shinano, using material from her younger sister. Some elements from no. 111 were used in the modification of Ise and Hyuga as carrier-battleships as well.


The ships of the Yamato class rarely fired a shot in anger and did not significantly alter the outcome of any battle in the Second World War. They were all sunk at sea. Musashi was sunk in the Sibuyan Sea by elements of the US Navy's Task Force 38 on 24 October 1944, having taken an astounding 20 torpedo and 17 bomb hits. Shinano was sunk while on her maiden voyage from the Naval Arsenal at Yokosuka to Kure on 29 November 1944 by four torpedoes fired by USS Archerfish (SS-311), She had been in commission 10 days. Yamato, first in class, was the last to be destroyed, on 7 April 1945, on a suicide mission to Okinawa. This is Operation Ten-Go, the last sortie of the Imperial Japanese Navy.


A diagram of the wreck of IJN Yamato
A diagram of the wreck of IJN Yamato
IJN Musashi under attack in the Sibuyan Sea, 24 October 1944
IJN Musashi under attack in the Sibuyan Sea, 24 October 1944
A diagram showing the torpedo hits on IJN Shinano, 29 November 1944
A diagram showing the torpedo hits on IJN Shinano, 29 November 1944

I wrote in a previous blog post about the sinking of Yamato. A book written by one of the survivors, Yoshida Mitsuru, was recently featured in another post focused on primary source material from Japan, translated into English. I suppose it's strange that I wrote about a ship that barely existed, indeed had never even touched salt water or had a name, before I wrote about Musashi, or Shinano. I suppose it's because I find her story a little more sad than most, and that's saying something. In my opinion, the Yamato class is the Imperial Japanese Navy in microcosm. Obsolete at launching, the two super battleships were hardly effective and only served to delay the inevitable, eventually falling victim to air power. The third sister barely graced the pages of the naval registry before going to the bottom, taken out like so many Japanese ships, by an American submarine.


What are your thoughts on the Yamato class? Have you heard of Warship 111 before? In what context? I'd love to hear your thoughts on this, and all things Imperial Japanese Navy. I look forward to the discussion. Happy exploring!


Tony





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