ICYMI: Battle of Guam 1941 and 1944 talk on WW2TV!

Tony Boccia
Aug 2
20 min read

Greetings everybody, I recently had the pleasure of returning to WW2TV for a talk on the Battle of Guam in 1941, when the Americans lost the island to the Japanese, and again in 1944, when the recapture took place. Last month, we marked the 81st anniversary of the second battle of Guam, so it seems like the right time to circle back on this video. I've linked it as well as the show notes below. Many of you will find some familiar sites here from elsewhere on the blog, I look forward to hearing your feedback on this video, enjoy!

Show Notes:

Slide 1: Introduction

Hello WW2TV fans, it’s great to be back here with you. Thanks Woody, for the invitation and warm welcome. If we’re meeting for the first time, I’m Tony Boccia, an active-duty U.S. Naval Officer with a specialty in aviation maintenance. I’m currently stationed in San Diego, California. I’m a historian, primarily focused on Imperial Japan, the expansion of that empire into the Southern Seas, and the rise and fall of the Imperial Japanese Navy. I was stationed in Japan for fifteen years and Guam for three, prior to San Diego.

This is my third time on WW2TV and I’m so pleased to be back; a few weeks ago we discussed the Battle of Saipan through the lens of the Imperial Japanese Army’s 43rd Division; today we’ll cover the Battle of Guam, where the IJA’s 29th Division fought the American III Marine Amphibious Corps to the death. One cannot fully understand this battle without first going over the Japanese taking of Guam in December 1941.

Slide 2: Guam in the larger context of Pacific Empires

This map from 1921 shows the various Pacific Mandates of the Pacific. The exponential Growth of the Japanese Empire following the end of the First World War meant that the Americans suddenly had a tenuous line across the Pacific from San Diego to Hawaii to Guam to Manila. The Japanese, benefiting from this geography, used these forward bases (in addition to others on Taiwan and Mainland China) as jumping-off points for the battles that would come to shape the opening of the Second World War.

Japanese plans for the Pacific War included capturing Guam in the war's early days. From March 1941, Japanese aircraft flew photo reconnaissance sorties over the island. Plans for the invasion of the island were completed in September 1941, and the South Seas Detachment was selected as the main unit responsible for this. The Americans made it easy on the Japanese by moving resources away from Guam toward Hawaii and San Diego.

Slide 3: Maps of Guam

Guam is the largest island in the Marianas by some measure; roughly 30 miles long and six wide. It has a rough, mountainous south covered largely by jungle and a high plateau to the north. Like Saipan, the island is comprised of rugged limestone and packed coral cliffs and ridges that dominate the landscape and make any movement about the island difficult, particularly in the heavier forested areas.

There are dozens of beaches on the island, with the largest ones situated to the west and south. Guam’s large, natural harbor, Apra, is north of the Orote Peninsula, which is now home to U.S. Naval Bases and the port of Guam, but in 1941 hosted a Marine Barracks, an airfield, and modest port facilities to include a hotel for the Pan-American Pacific Clippers. You can see the airstrips of the Orote airfield in this present-day photo.

You can see by this map that the highest peaks on Guam are in the south, where the highest peak (Lam Lam) rises to 400 meters. These aren’t real mountains but you’re going to hear a lot about taking various mountains in this talk, we’ll just have to accept that terminology today.

Slide 4: The invasion of Guam: December 10 1941

The South Seas Detachment was built and organized to capture Wake, Guam, and the Gilbert Islands, and the Imperial Japanese Army troops largely came from the 144th Infantry Regiment of the 55th Division in Korea and Manchuria. This force was under the command of Major General Horii Tomitarō. As part of the Southern Seas Force, the Imperial Japanese Navy had overall control. About 400 men of the 2nd Maizuru Special Naval Landing Force were assigned to the detachment as well.

These units were transported to Guam by nine transports escorted by the minelayer Tsugaru and four destroyers. The 6th Cruiser Division, composed of four heavy cruisers, was also available to provide support if needed. The landing force and naval units were supported by the 18th Naval Air Corps.

On the morning of 8 December, about four hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese land-based aircraft from Saipan attacked the Marine barracks, Piti Navy Yard, Libugon radio station, Standard Oil Company, and the Pan American Hotel. The air raids all over Guam continued into the morning and afternoon. The aerial bombardment began again the morning of the 9th, and that evening the Japanese invasion force left Saipan.

The 2nd Maizuru SNLF landed at Dungcas Beach, north of Agana before dawn on the 10th of December. They quickly wheeled south and attacked the Insular Force Guard in Agana, defeating them easily and moving on toward the Orote Peninsula, home to Sumay and the Marine barracks.

The principal engagement took place on Agana's Plaza de España at 04:45, when a few Marines and Insular Force guardsmen fought the Japanese attackers. After token resistance, the Marines, on McMillin's orders, surrendered at 05:45. McMillin officially surrendered at 06:00.

In the meantime the Japanese South Seas Detachment (about 4,800 men) under the command of General Horii made separate landings at Tumon Bay in the north, on the southwest coast near Merizo, and on the eastern shore of the island at Talofofo Bay. The Japanese completely overestimated the strength of American resistance on Guam (and underestimated the forces on Wake, I might add) and so by the time Horii got to Sumay, the fighting was over and Guam was secure. Horii was named Governor of Guam and held the post until the Imperial Japanese Navy keibitai (occupation force) relieved him in March 1942.

Slide 5: Images of the invasion of Guam 1941

Top left: Heavy cruiser Aoba, flagship of cruiser division six.

Bottom left: the IJA troop transport Yokohama Maru

Right: Major General Horii Tomitarō, commander of the IJA South Seas Detachment and Governor of Guam for a short period.

Bottom: photographs showing the invasion at Dungcas Beach

Slide 6: Occupation of Guam

The Japanese fortified Orote Airfield and began building an air stip at Tiyan, this was unfinished when the Americans showed up in July 1944.

Unlike Saipan, no large Japanese population. Attempts begin to ‘Japanize’ the island.

Guam renamed Omiya-Jima (Great Shrine Island)

Chammoro people were brutalized under the keibitai and forced into labor projects. The good will that had been present on Saipan and other islands in the Japanese mandate never existed here. The Chammoro people were expected to serve as sub-human slave labor in order to serve the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Movement to camps, from Agana

Warrant officer George TweedE

Slide 7: Who’s in charge on Guam 1944

31st Army: Lt. General Obata Hideyoshi: stood up in Nagoya, February 1944

29th Division: Lt. General Takashina Takeshi: reactivated in April 1941, moved from Manchuria to Nagoya, and then to Guam under the 31st Army. The 29th was comprised of the 18th 38th and 50th infantry regiments.

Some of you may remember from the Saipan episode that the 18th infantry regiment was attacked en route to Saipan in February 1944 with the loss of most of the regiment’s men, including its commander, and nearly all of its supplies. About 1,800 soldiers survived and were reorganized on Saipan, then sent to Guam. Roughly 600 men of the 18th remained behind on Saipan.

6th Expeditionary Force: Major General Shigematsu Kiyoshi six infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, and two engineer companies, including elements of the 1st and 11th Divisions, these troops all came from mainland Japan to bolster the Guam defenses.

Slide 8: Defense of Guam

With the arrival of the 29th Division headquarters on Guam, Lt. General Takashina was ordered to take command of all Army and Navy forces on the island, in addition to those on Rota. By 4 June, the military strength on the island was 18,500

Takashina quickly reorganized the smaller, straggler units force into two tactical units for greater efficiency. SNLF troops, aircrews with no aircraft, and various construction units were formed into the mixed brigade and regiment.

The 48th Independent Mixed Brigade formed four battalions (319th to 322nd) under General Shigematsu.

The 10th Independent Mixed Regiment comprised the remainder of the troops.

Pictured here is Takashina supervising the construction of defenses at Agat with Colonel Tsunetaro Suenaga. There were a great many unfinished projects; shore batteries like the ones pictured here (and the coastal defense guns we’ll look at later) were found unfinished all over the island. As time ran out for the Japanese, Takashina turned to fortifying the highlands with ammunition, medical supplies, water and food. Still, between May and June, American reconnaissance flights noted 121 enemy positions, and these are just the ones they could see.

Once the Americans captured the 31st Army HQ on Saipan, they found a trove of documents outlining the dispersion of forces throughout the Central Pacific. What they did not know, however, was exactly how many remained on Guam, who was in charge, and what the exact defenses were. Until the end of the battle of Guam, for example, the Americans had no idea Obata was there.

The Americans, therefore, knew roughly how Takashina had divided Guam and what to expect from the defenses there. A healthy respect for the motivation of the Japanese infantryman made the Americans delay the invasion of Guam one month, to allow for better preparation in the event a bigger reserve was needed to take the island. Here’s how Takashina divided Guam:

Two major defense sectors were established, under the two most intact and capable units on the island.

The 38th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Suenaga Tsunetaro on Mt. Alifan was responsible for the area from Facpi Point to Agat Bay, including Orote Peninsula.

In the Agat sector, 1/38 and 2/38 defended the area from Bangi Point to Agat Village. Naval infantry, antiaircraft, and coast defense units mainly from the 54th Keibitai covered Orote Peninsula with its airfield. A battery of mountain artillery and the 1st Company, 9th Tank Regiment supported the 38th Infantry.

The 48th Independent Mixed Brigade under Maj. Gen. Shigematsu Kiyoshi was responsible for the rest of the island, including Cabras Island and Asan.

General Shigematsu's dispositions included the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 10th IMR spread out from Umatac to Yona in southern Guam, with the regimental headquarters at Inarajan. The extreme northern portion of the island was assigned to 2/18 while the headquarters of the regiment was near Mt. Chachaond the 3d Battalion in the vicinity of Tepungan.

The infantry battalions of the 48th IMB were located as follows: the 320th behind the Asan beaches, the 321st spread out from Agana to the Tiyan airfield, and the 322d at Tumon Bay. Two battalions of artillery and the 2d Company, 9th Tank Regiment backed up the beach defenses.

The 29th Division also held a substantial mobile reserve in the hills behind Agana. Included in it were an infantry battalion and a tank company. Scattered throughout the island were coastal defense and AA positions, feeding information and intelligence back to either the 38th or 48th HQ.

Pictured here is a map, drawn after the battle, of the Japanese defensive posture. By the 15th July, most if not all of the men were in position, and although the American bombardment by air and sea disrupted their movement overland, the communication system was largely intact in the form of wired comms and radio. Takashina’s HQ is here at Fonte Plateau.

The Japanese were ordered to "seek certain victory at the beginning of the battle . . . to utterly destroy the landing enemy at the water's edge." And we can discuss this later but the Battle of Guam is actually the last time that the army attempted to stop the landings with brute force. From here on, they would retreat to hard defensive positions and fight by attrition.

Slide 9: W-Day and slide 10: Agat and Asan

Heres a map of the landing beaches on W-Day July 21st 1944, and again the Japanese positions. Takashina used Guam’s heat and rugged terrain to his advantage; the Japanese troops fought the Americans for every inch of beach as they attempted to get past the hundreds of obstacles and dozens of fortified positions situated in the high ground above Asan and Agat.

The facts on the ground did not look like the models that American troops had seen in briefs. For example, the Japanese had built huge bunkers of coconut logs and filled them with boulders, creating bottlenecks on the beaches and the approaches to Asan Ridge and the road to Hagatna. Concrete blockhouses, located on Gaan Point, held a 75mm and a 37mm gun. One 75mm field piece was situated on Yona Island. Many of these emplacements did not show through the scattered clouds on aerial photographs available prior to the landing. The blockhouses formed large sand covered mounds, and the many palm trees made detection difficult. IJA troops were able to fall back to rear areas for water, food, and medical attention while reinforcements came forward to lay down small arms and mortar fire on the enemy.

Here, in Agat, the incomplete status of the coastal defense guns and larger weapons served Takashina badly; he almost certainly could have been more effective in preventing the Americans from securing the beachhead at Agat (and probably Asan, also) had the weapons been ready. Still, the 38th regiment kept the Marines pinned down throughout W-Day thru W+1. The goal of the Americans was to capture Mt. Alifan, neutralizing the 38th and bottling up the 10th in the south.

At just before midnight on W-day the Japanese sent a charge against the lines of the 4th Marines at Agat. After a short mortar barrage, men with fixed bayonets briefly overran the American lines and killed several dozen men. Roughly a hundred Japanese soldiers infiltrated the lines that night, sabotaging howitzers and mortars, cutting communication wires, and picking off Marines. These infiltrators were largely unsuccessful, but it does go to show the aggressive nature of Takashina’s orders to his individual unit commanders.

The next day, a small rise called ‘Hill 40’ changed hands three times, the 38th infantry regiment was wiped out in this action although some stragglers fell back to HQ on Mt. Alifan. With the fall of Agat, the road to Mt. Alifan and southern Guam was opened, and although the Japanese did attempt to stop the American advance here, using some tanks and medium artillery, they did not seriously have a chance at stopping them. Alifan itself fell on the 22nd.

North of Orote Peninsula and facing the northern landing beaches, the 48th was holding Adelup point and preventing the 3rd Marine Division from establishing a beachhead. The heavily wooded limestone promontory was inaccessible by sea and the west face of the point was out of the firing line of the U.S. Navy ships offshore. This position would remain a thorn in the side of the Americans until they captured Asan up to the bottom of the cliffs below Fonte Plateau; they fired constantly on LVT’s as they slowed, stopped, and unloaded troops.

The goal of the 3rd Marine Division was to capture the high ground at Asan Ridge, secure the beachhead, and eventually push east toward Hagatna and South to Orote. The problem with capturing Asan Ridge was that the Japanese had extensively fortified it; the Marines succeeded in silencing the machine gun positions on the ridge, however General Shigematsu continually moved men and ammunition to the area and it was only after artillery had been established on the beachhead that the ridge was overcome. Shigematsu fell back to Adelup, and the remaining forces facing Asan fell back to the base of the cliffs.

Slide 11: Japanese counterattacks

GAAN POINT PILLBOX shows the scars of repeated shellings which failed to knock out this 75mm gun and a companion 37mm that accounted for many tractors and men in the first waves of the 22d Marines. (Navy Photograph.)

JAPANESE LIGHT TANK destroyed at the Company B, 4th Marines roadblock during the enemy counterattack on the night of 21-22 July. (Army Photograph.)

The Japanese had two problems facing them: the first was to prevent the Americans from creating any more of a beachhead at Asan and Agat. The second was to keep these two invasion forces from joining up and cutting off the Orote peninsula. As the Marines from Asan attempted to swing around Orote, they found that the Japanese had thoroughly lined the roads and beaches with land mines, booby traps, and buried, fused torpedoes and aerial bombs. This forced the Americans toward rice paddies instead of dry ground, and the slower movement of these units allowed the Japanese to open fire on them from caves and ridges along the Mt. Tenjo road. Mt. Tenjo, a grand name for a small hill, housed so many Japanese soldiers and ammunition that for four days (22-26 July) the Americans suffered near-constant casualties from the positions there.

As the Americans drove south toward Orote, they also drove toward Fonte Plateau. Takashina was watching his defenses in Asan, Adelup, and Orote fall apart in the face of overwhelming force. He decided on the 25th to send a well-organized assault with the intention of driving the Americans back into the sea. This isn’t quite the same as the banzai charges on Saipan, but it is very similar. Takashina sent not just his remaining front-line units but his reserves as well, with the intention to hit the American positions, supply dumps, and command posts all at once, covered by mortar and artillery fire.

Takashina’s plans were well hidden and although he had been probing the enemy lines to find weak points since the 22nd and artillery was constantly firing throughout the 25th, it came as a complete shock to the Americans when at 0400 on the 26th of July more than 1,000 Japanese soldiers appeared out of nowhere. The Japanese overran the 2nd Battalion 9th Marines and killed roughly half of the men there, with their own losses somewhere near 950 killed. Many of the Japanese soldiers coming down from the cliffs had TNT, magnetic mines, and grenades which they used to destroy American positions along with themselves. All told, the Japanese lost 3,500 men in this charge, the breaking point of the entire battle.

Slide 12: Orote Peninsula and Fonte Plateau

Commander Tamai Asaichi, IJN, 263d Air Group commander, had roughly 2,500 troops, a mix of the naval garrison, remnants of the 38th, two companies of antiaircraft troops, and about 600 men from aviation squadrons. He also had laborers, mostly Chammoro pressed into service. On the afternoon of 25 July, Tamai attempted to evacuate his force from Orote by barge, but was stopped by shellfire from the Marines on Asan ridge and the ships offshore. He then decided to attempt to break out through the American lines; that night his troops, drunk and armed with swords, pitchforks, sticks, and pieces of broken bottles, in addition to a few hundred rifles, swarmed the Marines. All of the attackers, 250-something in total, were killed. The remaining Japanese on Orote fought fiercely in a retreating action, finally losing control of the airfield, and the Marine Barracks. By the 29th of July, Orote was secured, the principal objective of the campaign.

It was at this point that the remainder of the organized Japanese forces fell back to the Fonte Plateau ridge. The morning of the 27th, 150 Japanese charged the American lines in what we now call a Banzai charge. We call it that because that’s what the Japanese were screaming, but actually the term is 玉砕 or gyokusai, which means ‘smashed jewel’, the word evokes an image of destroying something beautiful so that it won’t be taken or corrupted by anybody else.

The 29th Division's operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Takeda, later testified that after the charge of 25-26 July:

“It was estimated that it was no longer possible to expel the American forces from the island after the results of the general counterattack of the night of 25 July were collected in the morning to about noon of the 26th. After this it was decided that the sole purpose of combat would be to inflict losses on the American forces in the interior of the island. The chief reasons for the foregoing estimate were:

The loss of commanders in the counterattack of 25 July, when up to 95% of the officers (commissioned officers) of the sector defense forces died.
The personnel of each counterattacking unit were greatly decreased, and companies were reduced to several men.
The large casualties caused a great drop in the morale of the survivors.
Over 90% of the weapons were destroyed and combat ability greatly decreased.
The rear echelons of the American forces on Agat front landed in successive waves and advanced. There was little strength remaining on that front and the strength for counterattacks became nonexistent.
The Orote Peninsula defense force perished entirely.
There was no expectation of support from Japanese naval and air forces outside the island.

Considering the foregoing points all together, it became clear that it was impossible to counterattack and expel the enemy alone.”

By the 28th July, the 3rd Marine Division had taken Fonte Plateau with the exception of the ridge, which fell the following night after the Japanese made eleven attempts that night to break through the Marines’ permiter and free some of the isolated groups within it with the loss of 800 dead. The Americans now had complete control of the center of Guam, and although this isn’t the highest point, it is strategically more valuable as the top of Fonte commands the approaches in all directions. The Marines closed out Phase I of the recapture of Guam, and the Japanese began to retreat north.

The turning point of the campaign, securing the FBL, saw the Guamanians beginning to flock to the protection of the Americans. Corps estimated that military agencies had 1,331 civilians under their care by 31 July. The number had swelled to 5,530 by 2 August and two days later it had leaped to 12,100. Unfortunately, the combat units were ill prepared to handle this tremendous civilian problem. However, after the treatment the Japanese had given the Guamanians, they appreciated any help offered. Before long civil affairs sections took over and brought the situation under control.

Slide 13: Obata takes charge, Barrigada and Finegayan

There’s a report that during the 3rd Division’s rest on Fonte Plateau on the 28th that a full-dress military parade took place in Agana, among the ruins of the capital and chief village. If this is the case, it coincides with the death of General Takashina, who was killed on the afternoon of the 28th from machine gun fire. It is possible that this display, which the Japanese had to expect would be seen by the Americans, was related to Takashina’s death.

General Obata now took charge of the forces left on Guam. All told he commanded about 8,500 men, with about 6,000 being actual combat troops. Keep in mind, they started with 18,500. Obata ordered a general withdrawal to the north around Mt. Santa Rosa, and established two positions to prevent the Americans from getting there; the first was the village of Finegayan, and the other near Mt. Barrigada. As the 3rd Marine Division and 77th Army Infantry Division started moving north, they encountered more land mines, buried torpedoes, and booby traps. Tiyan Airfield was captured on the 1st August; this later became Naval Air Station Agana, and is now Guam International Airport. The Japanese provided only token resistance here.

North of the airfield and near the Pago River, the first of many Japanese concentration camps was freed in Asinan. About 2,000 people were kept here, guarded by only a few Japanese civilians. Nearby at Yona, Obata allowed the Americans to take a supply dump; up to this point the Japanese had not engaged the enemy in any organized way in almost four days. The Japanese position at Barrigada had not just supplies and troops but also a well of fresh water that could provide 30,000 gallons a day. The heights here are within view of Tiyan Airfield and the approach to Mt. Santa Rosa, although there was no artillery position established here before the battle and the entire area is covered in dense jungle and near-impassable trails.

As the 77th Division began traversing the road up to Mt. Barrigada, the Japanese came out of the jungles on either side of the road. Using a 20mm cannon, heavy machine guns, and small arms, the Japanese swarmed the tanks and trucks, then fled into the jungle with heavy casualties. Later that day, they trapped a column of Soldiers near the well, using the rugged terrain and dense jungle cover to their advantage. The American strategy was to take Mt. Barrigada on its western slope, with two flanking units moving alongside the main column.

About an hour into this maneuver the Japanese jumped on the flanking units, forcing three companies to come together in almost a single column and the Japanese would just not get dislodged from their positions; the sources aren’t clear on which troops took part in this action but with the loss of more than 10,000 so far, the capture of both the 38th and 48th HQ and the death of General Takashina, this is not surprising. The capture of Mt. Barrigada wasn’t complete until the 3rd August, when the well was secured and the heights captured.

The Japanese defended Finegayan Village using the road from Agana as the central position, knowing that the Americans, with their long supply lines, would need to use it. As the Marines moved up the road on the 3rdAugust, an estimated platoon of Japanese opened fire, dug in on either side of the road across an open area that gave them excellent fields of fire. Further up the road, the IJA troops used ravines, heavy brush, and palm groves in delaying the Americans. They did succeed in stopping the advance briefly, although roughly 100 Japanese soldiers were killed here.

Beyond the village on the road to Santa Rosa, a Japanese force with 70mm mortars and heavy machine guns stopped an advanced convoy unit that had attempted to break through the supply line to reinforce the 77thtroops there. That night, the Japanese again broke through Marine lines using two medium tanks and some mortars. They did not stop the American advance, and by the 5th August the Marines and Soldiers had joined up beyond Finegayan and were bringing supplies forward into Dededo.

Slide 13: Mt. Santa Rosa, and the end

Obata had at least seven heavy artillery pieces around Mt. Santa Rosa, and continued to harass the Americans from a distance of about six miles. IJA troops also fired 75mm and 105mm guns at roads, columns, and any other targets that presented themselves. The fall of Finegayan, however, broke Obata’s outer ring of defense and this is the beginning of the end of the Battle of Guam.

One Japanese officer later wrote:

The enemy airforce seeking our units during the daylight hours in the forest, bombed and strafed even a single soldier. During the night, the enemy naval units attempting to cut our communications were shelling our position from all points of the perimeter of the island, thus impeding our operation activities to a great extent.

The afternoon of 7 August, the 77th drove toward Mt. Santa Rosa. Early on, a network of ‘octopus traps’ (foxholes, to us) opened up on the Americans and slowed them down. Obata’s troops here probably numbered about 110-150, however they stopped an American battalion from advancing for six full hours. Further on, a small position formed around two light tanks, anti-tank and 20mm guns, light and heavy machine guns, and a makeshift infantry battalion stopped the American Soldiers fully. To their west, the 3rd Marine Division moved to within 1000 yards of Mt. Santa Rosa, roughly even with the Army lines. Once more, the Japanese tried another tank/infantry raid across the enemy lines but it was largely unsuccessful. By 1000 on the 8th of August, the position was captured, however some 4,000 troops and laborers had escaped from the area and had fallen back to Mataguac. On the way, they had killed and in some cases beheaded some 50 local men of the surrounding area.

In the evening of the 8th of August, General Staff in Tokyo had been notified that the Americans held 9/10 of the island and the collapse of Guam was imminent. By this point, the Americans had moved to the northern point of the island (Ritidian), held all of the landing beaches, all of the airfields. The last Japanese command post fell on the 11th, when locals told the Marines that there was an underground bunker at Mataguac. This turned out to be a large space, roughly 100’ by 40’, in which the Japanese held out to the last man. This was the last organized resistance on Guam, and Lt. General Obata killed himself here, one day after the message was sent from the Americans confirming the fall of Guam. The count at the time was 10,971 Japanese troops killed. Later estimates have it more than 18,000 dead and 1200 captured.

Finally, here's some photos from around Guam and the sites we talked about:

Ha. 62-76 Japanese Midget Attack Submarine – same type as captured at Pearl Harbor. These are the only two complete extant examples. The Pearl Harbor boat, HA-19, is in the National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredricksburg, Texas.

Agat unit fortifications and some artifacts remain, including this gun and an AA position alongside several pillboxes.

Japanese cave fortifications on Orote Peninsula

Fortifications around Asan Ridge and view from the top looking north

Piti Guns

Asan Bay overlook

South Pacific Memorial Peace Park – at the site of Mataguac command post in Yigo. There are many stone monuments surrounding this larger one, and a small chapel dedicated to peace that has some artifacts from the war inside. This marker is for the 38th Infantry regiment. The faded sign marks the spot where General Obata committed suicide and organized resistance on Guam ended.

Thanks for checking out the video and notes, see you next time!

Resources:

Foundations and Collections

Guam Preservation Trust:

https://guampreservationtrust.org/

War in the Pacific National Historic Park

https://www.nps.gov/wapa/index.htm

University of Guam Micronesia Area Research Center (MARC)

https://www.uog.edu/marc-home

Websites

Erenow – The American taking of Guam 1944:

https://erenow.org/ww/grunts-inside-american-infantry-combat-experience/2.php